Mediation and Negotiation in South Korea and Japan

By Julie Kim 

Since Japan’s colonization of Korea from 1910 to 1945, relations between the two countries have been rocky.[1]  In 1965, the United States helped with the signing of a normalization treaty between Japan and South Korea; Japan believes that this resolved all reparation questions.[2]  However, the treaty was signed secretly and pushed through the legislature under South Korean dictator Park Chung-Hee.  Additionally, Japan possessed much greater power than South Korea at the time, leaving Koreans with few options and raising questions from Koreans’ perspective of the treaty’s legitimacy.[3]  More importantly, the treaty did not properly address the issues of Japanese wartime military brothels and forced labor,[4] nor did it clearly state “if the settlements were grant aid from Japan or reparations for colonization.”[5]  As such, victims were not compensated, and capital secured from Japan through the treaty was used for economic development.[6]

In 2015, South Korean President Park Geun-hye, daughter of former dictator Park Chung-Hee, entered a “final and irreversible deal” with Japan, which sought to resolve the issue of “comfort women” who were forced to serve as Japanese military brothel workers.[7]  Under the deal, Japan apologized to the victims and provided one billion yen (approximately $8.3 million) toward a fund for victims.[8]  The following South Korean President, Moon Jae-in, disbanded the fund, stating that the deal was done in haste and that the political agreement should have consulted former victims and their supporters.[9]  In 2018, Seoul’s Supreme Court ruled that two Japanese companies should compensate South Koreans for forced labor during colonization, igniting a trade war between the two nations.[10]

South Koreans believe that past treaties were not fair or final settlements; past negotiations were not transparent and did not consider the voices of the victims, lacking restorative justice.[11]  As both Japan and South Korea’s ally, the United States could assist in resolving the long-standing conflict by acting as a neutral third-party mediator.  This assumes that both countries voluntarily request intervention, a rule of preventive diplomacy.[12]  Under President Joe Biden, the United States could help with a new reconciliation agreement that consults comfort women survivors and forced laborers,[13] who are at the heart of the matter.  Through considerate discussions, the Biden administration could mediate a settlement between Japan and South Korea to encourage mutual understanding,[14] and provide insight and a neutral location.[15]  Leaders should prioritize victims and restorative justice, rather than focus on strategic gains.  The Biden administration, as a third-party, can further mediate and assist with treaty compliance by applying diplomatic pressure if one side does not uphold its end of the deal; this, along with language in the agreement that can be used against the retracting state,[16] would discourage backpedaling.[17]  Transparency is crucial in negotiating a reconciliation agreement, and the agreement should contain language that clearly states Japan’s war guilt and South Korea’s acceptance of the sincere apology.  As the third (Japan)[18] and tenth (South Korea)[19] largest economies, relations and trade wars in East Asia can have a global impact, such as slowing the production of semiconductors and display screens.[20]  With a focus on the victims’ perspectives, a future attempt at reconciliation between Japan and South Korea has the possibility to succeed.

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[1] South Korea and Japan’s Feud Explained, BBC News (Dec. 2, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-49330531 [https://perma.cc/7Q9W-Q9JW].

[2] Xuan Dung Phan, How the US Can Mediate the Japan-South Korea Dispute, Diplomat (Dec. 16, 2020), https://thediplomat.com/2020/12/how-the-us-can-mediate-the-japan-south-korea-dispute/ [https://perma.cc/SC23-S94B].

[3] Tom Phuong Le, Negotiating in Good Faith: Overcoming Legitimacy Problems in the Japan-South Korea Reconciliation Process, 78 J. Asian Stud. 621, 630–32 (2019).

[4] Phan, supra note 2.

[5] Le, supra note 3, at 629.

[6] Phan, supra note 2.

[7] Japan and South Korea Agree WW2 ‘Comfort Women’ Deal, BBC News (Dec. 28, 2015), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-35188135 [https://perma.cc/Q28L-UHPZ].

[8] Id.

[9] Phan, supra note 2.

[10] Id.

[11] See Joanna Diaz, Negotiating the “Comfort Women” Issue in the 21st Century, Inst. Sec. & Dev. Pol’y (Dec. 19, 2018), https://isdp.eu/negotiating-the-comfort-women-issue-in-the-21st-century/ [https://perma.cc/8TKF-QP9R].

[12] Le, supra note 3, at 638.

[13] Phan, supra note 2.

[14] Id.

[15] Le, supra note 3, at 635.

[16] Id.

[17] Id.

[18] Japan Country Profile, BBC News (Sept. 16, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-14918801 [https://perma.cc/36EF-JLYB].

[19] S. Korea Now Ranks World’s 10th Biggest Economy, Hankyoreh (Apr. 22, 2021, 3:55 AM), https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_business/992192.html [https://perma.cc/5FBQ-UJGY].

[20] Yen Nee Lee, The Japan-South Korea Dispute Could Push Up the Price of Your Next Smartphone, CNBC (July 22, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/07/23/japan-south-korea-dispute-impact-on-semiconductor-supply-chain-prices.html [https://perma.cc/RA9F-9J37].