ARBITRAL INSTITUTIONS THROUGH THE MAGNIFIER: ON THE NATURE OF THEIR DECISIONS AND EXPOSURE TO SUIT†

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I. Introduction

Arbitral institutions play an essential role in the administration of arbitration disputes. Their arbitration rules give potential disputing parties a clear understanding of the sequence of their dispute. The rules highlight both the obligations the arbitral institution agrees to assume towards the parties as well as the institution's asserted rights. Although the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL") Model Law inspired the rules of many arbitral institutions,1 no institution works in a legal vacuum. They are embedded in the national legal framework of their respective locales. As a result, each set of institutional rules reflects the domestic laws, or should. The arbitral rules interact with national legislation, which either bolsters or circumscribes them. This Article focuses on the interaction between the institution's rights and obligations, on one hand, and the legal systems in which they are embedded, on the other.

To illustrate this interaction, we look at the legal nature of arbitral institutions' decisions and of institutions' relationships with parties and arbitration relationships. We do that by reviewing

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whether arbitral institutions’ decisions can be appealed in front of the local courts, or whether the institutions’ broadly framed immunity clauses are valid under national laws. We look at past case law to see how national courts treat institutions’ decisions and their relationships with the arbitrators and parties.

We take a close look at eighteen sets of arbitration rules, representing diverse legal systems from different regions around the globe and explore their similarities and differences. Specifically, this Article studies the arbitration rules of the following arbitral institutions: the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”), the Cairo Regional Centre for International Commercial Arbitration (“CRCICA”), the Court of Arbitration of the Official Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Madrid (“CAM”), the Dubai International Arbitration Centre (“DIAC”), the German Institution of Arbitration (“DIS”), the Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre (“HKIAC”), the International Arbitration Rules of the International Court for Dispute Resolution (“ICDR”), the International Chamber of Commerce (“ICC”), the International Commercial Arbitration Court at the Russian Federation Chamber of Commerce and Industry (“ICAC”), the Kuala Lumpur Regional Centre for Arbitration (“KLRCA”), the London Court of International Arbitration (“LCIA”), the Qatar International Centre for Conciliation and Arbitration (“QICCA”), the Regional Centre for International Commercial Arbitration in Lagos, Nigeria (“RCIAL”), the Singapore International Arbitration Centre (“SIAC”), the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (“SCC”), the Tehran Regional Arbitration Centre (“TRAC”), the Vienna International Arbitral Centre (“VIAC”), the Swiss Chambers’ Arbitration Institution (“SCAI”), the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”), and the Permanent Court of Arbitration (“PCA”).

II. SCOPE OF THE AUTHORITY OF ARBITRAL INSTITUTIONS

A. The Role of Arbitral Institutions is Complex, and its Scope Differs from Institution to Institution

Arbitral institutions are competent bodies for administering arbitration disputes. In contrast to ad hoc arbitrations, disputing parties voluntarily submit to the rules when engaging in institu-
tional arbitration proceedings. The law applicable to the relationship between parties and arbitral institutions is usually undefined. Accordingly, conflict of law rules determine which body of law applies to the relationship and how the relationship is defined. Generally, arbitral institutions endeavor to waive liability for their work by broad immunity clauses. However, whether those clauses are valid depends on the national laws at the locale of the institution.

Arbitral institutions execute multiple functions during the administration of disputes. Initially, they offer logistical services, the foundation that institutional and ad hoc arbitrations often share. Generally, they provide meeting rooms for arbitration hearings and translation services. Additionally, they are the communication conduit between the arbitral tribunal and the parties. Arbitral institutions circulate submissions between the parties and the tribunal, transmit orders of the tribunal to the parties, and relay correspondence among all of them. Moreover, arbitral institutions have the power to make arbitration agreements come to life, and to maintain the procedural fairness and credibility of the arbitration regime as an alternative to litigation. Additionally, they set the costs of the proceeding.

Exceptionally, some arbitration rules give the relevant institution wide authority. For example, the arbitration rules of the AAA provide parallel authority to the tribunal on extensions of time for submissions. The AAA may exercise the authority to extend the time after the constitution of the tribunal. Similarly, under the CAM Rules, Article 39.3 empowers the CAM Court to extend the time limit for making awards based on the tribunal’s request. Often the authority to extend the time limits lies with the parties to the dispute. Similarly, Article 19.3 of the DIAC Rules gives DIAC’s Executive Committee the same authority, even without

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2 Rolf A. Schütze, *Introduction to Institutional Arbitration: Article-by-Article Commentary* 1, 2, (Rolf A. Schütze ed., 2013) [hereinafter Schütze].

3 Id.; see also Hans van Houtte & Bridie McAsey, *The Liability of Arbitrators and Arbitral Institutions, in Arbitral Institutions Under Scrutiny: ASA Special Series No. 40* 133 (Philipp Habegger et al. eds., 2013).


5 Id.


7 Id.
the relevant tribunal’s request to DIAC’s Executive Committee. The ICC also affords its Court the same authority in Article 31 of its Arbitration Rules. The HKIAC may exercise the extension authority only if the tribunal directs it to do so under Article 2.4.

Arbitral institutions’ decisions on the conduct of arbitral proceedings may cover a wide range of topics, from preliminary rulings to challenges to the selection of an arbitrator. While some institutions include the grounds for their decisions, others provide no reasoning, complicating appeal efforts. There is accordingly no unanimously accepted approach on whether reasons for opinions must always be given or not.

In October 2015, Alexis Mourre, the president of the ICC, announced the ICC would include explanations and reasons for, among other things, prima facie rulings, initiating arbitrator’s replacement proceedings, replacement of an arbitrator on its own motion, and consolidation proceedings. The new ICC policy entered into force and is now utilized for all ongoing cases. The policy includes situations where the parties so agreed and submitted a request for reasons prior to seeking a decision from the ICC Court. Only involved parties receive explanations for ICC Court decisions. The 2017 ICC Rules have incorporated the new policy. The authors of this Article agree with Mr. Mourre’s statement that, “[p]roviding reasons for court decisions will further enhance the transparency and clarity of the ICC arbitration process. This new service is a sign of our commitment to ensuring that ICC arbitration is fully responsive to the needs of our users the world over.”

By contrast, the LCIA Rules do not require decisions of the LCIA Court under Article 29.1 to include reasoning despite the decisions’

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12 Id.

13 Id.
binding effect. However, an exception under Article 10.6 holds that challenges of arbitrators must be reasoned.

1. The Scope May Include the Preliminary Screening on Requests for Arbitration

Arbitral institutions are generally empowered to screen requests for arbitration on a preliminary basis. They examine whether to accept or decline to administer the requested arbitral proceedings. Arbitral institutions decide on whether a valid arbitration agreement exists, whether it applies to the dispute at hand, and whether the agreement is subject to the arbitration rules of that institution. This power has been termed the "gatekeeper function." Accordingly, scholars suggest that arbitral institutions must be convinced that it is more likely than not an arbitration agreement exists. Following receipt of the notice of arbitration, arbitral institutions ensure that they are prima facie competent to administer the dispute under the arbitration agreement, and some institutions also review the validity of arbitration agreements.

However, the decision to administer a dispute does not prevent a tribunal from later deciding to dismiss the claim for lack of valid arbitration agreement, or for other reasons. An arbitral institution will generally not proceed with administering a dispute if it finds that it lacks the competence to do so. This decision, however, does not affect the validity of the arbitration agreement. Accordingly, the disputing parties may resubmit the very same dispute in another forum before another arbitral institution.

The CAM's approach differs from the general approach. Even if the CAM Court finds no valid arbitration agreement, the

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15 Id.
21 ICC Rules, supra note 19, at art. 6.4.
CAM may proceed to constitute the tribunal where an applicant insists the request for arbitration proceed. The arbitral tribunal reviews the decision on the validity of the arbitration agreement in the form of a partial award (Rule 8.1.b), within thirty days after composition of the arbitral tribunal.

Some arbitral institutions avoid exercising their gatekeeper function. The LCIA gives its Court the authority to proceed with the arbitration proceeding regardless of the arbitration request’s completeness. Likewise, the QICCA does not screen the sufficiency of the request, but leaves the decision to the arbitral tribunal.

At the ICC, the screening power is exercised only after the request for arbitration has been registered and the respondent has filed its answer, often involving numerous jurisdictional objections. If the respondent does not raise jurisdictional objections, the ICC will administer the proceeding. Under ICC rules, the respondent’s answer gives rise to a subsequent agreement to arbitrate, regardless of the previous arbitration agreement. By contrast, if the respondent files a plea, objection, or does not answer the request for arbitration, the arbitral tribunal will rule on the matter unless the Secretary General refers the matter directly to the ICC Court.

By contrast, the SCC Board has exclusive authority to make prima facie decisions on any objection or challenge to SCC jurisdiction.

Exceptionally, the ICAC goes further in its approach, or at least in the nomenclature of its own decisions. Where a statement of claim (request for arbitration) is defective but the claimant insists on proceeding, “the ICAC shall either make an arbitral award or rule to terminate the proceedings.” Qualifying the ICAC’s decision as an arbitral award is unusual for an arbitral institution. It

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22 CAM Rules, supra note 6, at 14.
23 Id.
24 LCIA Rules, supra note 14, at art. 5.1.
26 See Carlevaris, supra note 17, at 178.
27 ICC Rules, supra note 19, at arts. 6.3, 6.4.
indicates that the ICAC does not view such a decision as administrative, but rather juridical in nature.

Investment claims filed at ICSID are subject to a similar level of scrutiny. Based on the power of the Secretary-General to “screen” requests under Article 36.3, the Secretary-General may refuse registration of requests for arbitration that manifestly fall outside ICSID’s jurisdiction. However, the Secretary-General is obliged to register the request if there are any doubts whatsoever.

2. Interpretation of the Relevant Institutional Rules

Most often, the rules entitle arbitral institutions to interpret rules to the same extent they administer disputes. For instance, the ICDR Rules as well as the HKIAC Rules give their administrative body the sole power to interpret and apply their rules. This does not hinder arbitral tribunals from interpreting relevant rules to the extent relevant to their function. Some rules restrict this interpretation power. For instance, Article 2.5 of the CAM Rules allows its Court to rule on questions of interpretation with final determination only until the composition of the tribunal. In contrast, Article R-8 of the AAA Rules grants the AAA this authority even if there is disagreement between the members of the tribunal regarding the meaning or application of the AAA Rules. AAA interpretive decisions are final.

3. The Scope Covers the Determination of Arbitrators’ Appointments and Challenges

International arbitration is, among other things, a mechanism that first and foremost ensures the application of the rule of law. Hence, it is crucial to maintain integrity and transparency within the arbitration process. Therefore, special attention is paid to who decides arbitral disputes. Overseeing the appointment of the arbit-

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31 Id.; see also Sergio Puig & Chester W. Brown, Note, The Secretary-General’s Power to Refuse to Register a Request for Arbitration under the ICSID Convention, 27 ICSID REV. 172, 176 (2012).
32 INT’L CTR. DISPUTE RESOLUTION, INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCEDURES art. 39, https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/ICDR%20Rules_0.pdf [hereinafter ICDR Rules]; see also HKIAC RULES, supra note 10, at art. 3.1.
33 CAM RULES, supra note 6, at 9.
34 AAA RULES, supra note 4, at art. R-8.
Central tribunal is one of the essential functions of the arbitral institution to ensuring procedural fairness, whereby arbitral institutions have an appointing duty. Usually, the institutional rules set out the methodology for appointment of the member(s) of the arbitral tribunal, specifying that each party shall appoint one arbitrator, and then the appointed arbitrators together nominate the presiding arbitrator. Moreover, most arbitral institutions authorize the institution to make the appointments whenever parties fail to do so. This prevents the respondent party from being able to frustrate the proceedings by failing to appoint an arbitrator and helps to uphold the efficiency of the arbitration process.

Further, some arbitration rules subject arbitrators’ nominations to the relevant institution’s confirmation. In that vein, a disputing party’s nomination does not necessarily guarantee that the nominee will sit as arbitrator. For instance, pursuant to the CAM Rules, nominations are subject to the CAM Court’s affirmation or refusal. Likewise, the DIAC Rules, as well as the VIAC Rules, give the competent authority the power to refuse confirmation of a nominated arbitrator if it considers that there are strong reasons to do so. The ICC Rules empower its Court with similar confirmation authority. In contrast, the RCICAL Rules allow the institution to refuse an arbitrator appointment only where parties delegated the appointing authority to a third party— inappropriate appointments from the RCICAL perspective. The inappropriateness referred to may only relate to independence, impartiality, and the unsuitableness of the arbitrator.

In a recent drive to promote transparency, the ICC announced that for cases registered as of January 1, 2016, it will publish on its website the names of the arbitrators sitting in ICC cases, including whether they act as chairperson or party appointed arbitrator, their nationality, as well as whether the appointment was made by the ICC Court or by the parties. This information is released on the

36 CAM Rules, supra note 6, at art. 13.
37 DIAC Rules, supra note 8, at art. 9.7.
ICC website once the terms of reference and the first procedural order have been agreed to.\textsuperscript{42} Arbitral institutions also decide on challenges to arbitrators filed by the parties due to an alleged lack of independence or impartiality. Some institutions submit the reasons for their decision. For instance, as mentioned earlier, the LCIA Court is required to provide a reasoned decision in accordance with Articles 10.5 and 10.6, unless the parties agree otherwise.\textsuperscript{43} Other institutions that take a similar approach are the VIAC or the DIS. However, these institutions are not bound to provide reasons. The CRCICA Rules do not require disqualification decisions—final and not challengeable—to include explanations.\textsuperscript{44}

In the past, the ICC occasionally published summaries of reasoning of selected decisions on arbitrator challenges. Nonetheless, the ICC default position was to provide no reasons for any decisions. An earlier version of Article 11.4 stated, "[t]he decisions of the Court as to the appointment, confirmation, challenge or replacement of an arbitrator shall be final, and the reasons for such decisions shall not be communicated."\textsuperscript{45} With the new 2017 ICC Rules the ICC has adapted a new default position.\textsuperscript{46}

Like the ICC, the SCC publishes summaries of its decisions on challenges to arbitrators.\textsuperscript{47} Remarkably, under Swedish law, decisions by the SCC Board following a challenge are final only in matters referred to in Section 8 of the Swedish Arbitration Act. It provides that a decision by the SCC Board following a challenge due to lack of agreed qualifications of an arbitrator is not final under Swedish law, i.e. this ground may, notwithstanding a decision

\textsuperscript{42} José Ricardo Feris, Las Nuevas Políticas de la Corte de Arbitraje de la CCI para Promover la Transparencia y Eficiencia, Club Español del Arbitraje (Feb. 17, 2016), https://www.clubarbitraje.com/es/las-nuevas-politicas-de-la-corte-de-arbitraje-de-la-cci-para-promover-la-transparencia-y-eficiencia.

\textsuperscript{43} LCIA Rules, supra note 14.

\textsuperscript{44} CRCICA Rules, supra note 20 at Article 13.6, CRCICA By-Laws of the Advisory Committee, Article 3(1)(c).


\textsuperscript{46} ICC Rules, supra note 19.

by the SCC Board, serve as a ground for challenge of the arbitral award pursuant to Section 34 of the Swedish Arbitration Act.48

There is criticism around the continuing secrecy of the reasoning behind decisions on arbitrator challenges.49 Considerations, including avoiding embarrassment to arbitrators, have been asserted to rationalize the refusal to provide reasons. However, Gary Born rightly suggests that, "[g]reater transparency would enhance the predictability and consistency of decisions and would reduce the number of opportunistic challenges."50

Through their rules, arbitral institutions assist in the enforcement of the parties' agreement to arbitrate. For example, in the case where the parties had agreed to appoint a sole arbitrator but failed to do so. For instance, the rules of CRCICA authorize the Centre to nominate the sole arbitrator.51 The same principle may apply in a three-arbitrator tribunal, or multi-party tribunal, as the rules of SIAC show.52 Almost all institutional rules have mechanisms to appoint arbitrators in case of failure by a party to do so. Apart from that, it is the responsibility of arbitral institutions to ensure that arbitrators satisfy the minimum qualifications to act as arbitrators. This confirmation process allows institutions to do so.

Additionally, before the constitution of a tribunal, a party may apply to the arbitral institution seeking appointment of an emergency arbitrator, if the relevant institutional rules enable it to do so. The arbitral institution then reviews the application and decides whether it is necessary to appoint an emergency arbitrator.53

ICSID is the only arbitral institution that has an annulment mechanism. It enjoys the exclusive authority to appoint the members of the annulment committee,54 which decides whether to dismiss the annulment request or uphold it. The parties do not have any say in the appointment of these members.55

48 Id. at 3.
50 Id.
51 CRCICA Arbitration Rules, supra note 20, at art. 8.
53 LCIA Rules, supra note 14, at art. 9B.
54 ICSID Convention, supra note 30, at art. 51.3.
55 Id.
4. The Scope of Authority May Cover the Consolidation of Disputes

The powers of arbitral institutions encompass, inter alia, the authority to consolidate cases. Consolidating multi-party or multi-contract disputes presupposes a certain legal relationship and the existence of an arbitration clause referring to a specific arbitral institution. If a dispute arises between the same parties to the pending disputes, pursuant to the same arbitration rules, and depending on the same arbitration clause, the relevant disputes generally may be consolidated. The power to consolidate generally rests on two conditions. First, a party requests consolidation. Second, the arbitral tribunal approves the request after the opposing disputant party consents to consolidation.

However, arbitration rules differ. Some arbitral institutions, such as the SCC, ICC, or LCIA, require that the parties to the arbitration must either be the same, or bound by a single arbitration agreement or compatible arbitration agreements to make consolidation possible. Pursuant to Articles 11 and 15 of SCC Rules, the decision allowing consolidation is at the discretion of the board of the SCC, after consulting the parties and the arbitral tribunal.\(^5\) Additionally, the SCC Rules and the ICC Rules authorize the administration bodies to consolidate two disputes not based on the same arbitration clause but instead on sufficiently compatible clauses.\(^5\)

The LCIA Rules only allow consolidation if the request is made prior to the composition of the arbitral tribunal, or if the newly composed tribunals of the cases subject to the consolidation request are identical.\(^5\) Section 35 of the English Arbitration Act (the “EAA”) sets forth almost the same requirements.\(^5\) Further, according to Article 15 of the VIAC Rules, the Board of the VIAC enjoys the discretionary power to consolidate multiple proceedings.\(^6\) Article 15 stipulates three conditions for a consolidation request to be evaluated. Namely: (i) the parties agreeing to consolidation; (ii) the tribunals are identical; and (iii) the location of the arbitration is the same.\(^6\)

\(^5\) SCC RULES, supra note 28, at arts. 11, 15.
\(^5\) Id.; see also ICC RULES, supra note 19, at art. 10.
\(^5\) LCIA RULES, supra note 14, at art. 22.1.x.
\(^6\) VIAC RULES, supra note 38, at art. 15.
\(^6\) Id.
By contrast, the HKIAC Rules permit consolidation even when the arbitrations are conducted under multiple arbitration agreements and where tribunals are not identical.\(^{(62)}\) To ensure party equality, if the HKIAC decides that multiple arbitral proceedings are to be consolidated, the parties are deemed to have waived their rights to appoint arbitrators and the institution will appoint a new tribunal. The UNCITRAL Rules do not cover consolidation of disputes.\(^{(63)}\) Likewise, the AAA Rules used to prohibit consolidation of proceedings, unless the competent court directed the parties to do so.\(^{(64)}\) The ICDR, the international division of the AAA, permits consolidation.\(^{(65)}\) The KLRCA Rules give extensive details about consolidation, leaving it to its Director to ultimately decide this issue.\(^{(66)}\) KLRCA itself has an important role in the consolidation process.

Some scholars find the consolidation of proceedings entail a number of miscellaneous problems. The list of purported problems includes: (1) lack of the parties’ consent; (2) non-participation in the appointment of the arbitral tribunal; (3) potential infringements of a party’s substantive rights; (4) allocation of arbitral fees and other costs; and (5) general lack of efficiency.\(^{(67)}\) By the same token, we consider the classification of the involvement of an arbitral institution in the consolidation process as exercising a form of “power” inaccurate. For instance, Section 35 of the EAA refers to consolidation as a “right” of the parties of the potential consolidated disputes.\(^{(68)}\) The parties to the arbitration proceedings and the arbitral tribunals are the main players of the consolidation process, except in SCC proceedings. The decision of arbitral institutions to consolidate ongoing disputes results from the consensus between the disputing parties and the power of the arbitral tribunal.

\(^{(62)}\) HKIAC Rules, supra note 10, at art. 28.


\(^{(65)}\) AAA Rules, supra note 4, at art. 8.


\(^{(68)}\) EAA, supra note 59, at art. 35.
to consolidate the proceedings. The arbitral institution decision in this regard is "declaratory" in nature, except in SCC proceedings.\textsuperscript{69}

The process of consolidation pursuant to the LCIA Rules differs. Pursuant to Articles 22.1 and 22.6, both the arbitral tribunal and the LCIA Court can exercise the power of consolidation. It is not a prerequisite that a disputing party requests consolidation, though the arbitral tribunal and the LCIA Court must seek the views of the parties. Yet, the arbitral tribunal might not consolidate without the LCIA Court's approval.\textsuperscript{70} Thus, the regulation of the consolidation under the LCIA Rules reflects an authentic power of an arbitration institution to consolidate on its own initiative, without the parties' approval, if necessary.

The 2013 SIAC Rules did not permit for consolidation except where the parties agreed to consolidation. Yet, the 2016 Rules organize consolidation more broadly\textsuperscript{71} in order to make it more applicable. Consolidation has three intrinsic features. First, pursuant to Article 8, if the SIAC Court rejects a request for consolidation, the same party may resubmit the same request to the pertinent tribunal to accept it.\textsuperscript{72} This suggests that the SIAC Court decision is temporary as to this concern. We consider that this adds an exception to the finality principle stated under Article 40.1.\textsuperscript{73} Second, in certain cases, the 2016 Rules deem a request for consolidation to have been submitted although the claimant has not applied for it.\textsuperscript{74} Like the LCIA Rules, this grants a strong consolidation power to the SIAC Court and the tribunal. Third, both the SIAC Court and arbitral tribunals can decide on consolidation requests.

5. The Scope Encompasses Decisions on Costs

i. Registration Fees

Institutional arbitration rules include mechanisms pursuant to which institutions set the fees they retain for administering arbitration proceedings as well as the arbitrators' fees, which make up the costs of the proceedings.

\textsuperscript{69} SCC RULES, supra note 28.
\textsuperscript{70} LCIA RULES, supra note 14, at arts. 22.1, 22.6.
\textsuperscript{71} SIAC RULES, supra note 52, at r. 8.
\textsuperscript{73} SIAC RULES, supra note 52, at art. 40.1.
\textsuperscript{74} Id. at art. 6.1.b.
Article 1.vi of the LCIA Rules authorizes the LCIA to refuse to register a notice of arbitration if the applicant fails to enclose proof of payment of the registration fee. The registration fee covers the fees prescribed in the schedule attached to the rules, the fees and expenses of the emergency arbitrator if applicable, and the administrative costs of the LCIA.\textsuperscript{75} Article 7.2 of the SCC authorizes its secretariat to give an extension for payment of the registration fees, whereafter it must dismiss the notice of arbitration if the claimant fails to make the payment after the lapse of the extension.\textsuperscript{76} Likewise, Article 4.4 of the ICC Rules stipulates that the file is to be closed if the claimant fails to pay the filing fee.\textsuperscript{77} However, Article R.53 of the AAA Rules gives the AAA the power, in exceptional circumstances, to defer the payment of its administrative fees.\textsuperscript{78} Generally, before appointment of any arbitrator, the AAA may suspend or terminate the proceedings.\textsuperscript{79}

ii. Cost of the Proceedings

Most arbitral institutions enjoy discretionary power to suspend or end the proceedings if one of the parties fails to pay its share of the provisional costs of the proceedings. For instance, Article 47 of the CRCICA Rules authorizes the CRCICA to suspend the proceedings or end them if a party fails to pay its share of the provisional cost of the proceedings. However, the CRCICA only has this authority before the composition of the tribunal or before the commencement of the proceeding.\textsuperscript{80} Likewise, Article 36 of the ICDR Rules grants this authority to the administrative body before the composition of the tribunal, and passes it to the tribunal after the composition of the tribunal.\textsuperscript{81} Article 10 of the CAM Rules\textsuperscript{82} and Article 36.4 of the TRAC Rules\textsuperscript{83} empower their Courts to suspend or end the proceedings in this situation.

Most arbitral institutions, if not all, allow the opposing party to the dispute to rescue the proceeding by paying the other party’s share of the provisional cost of the proceeding. Rule 13.6 of the

\textsuperscript{75} LCIA RULES, supra note 14, at art. 1.vi.
\textsuperscript{76} SCC RULES, supra note 28, at art. 7.2.
\textsuperscript{77} ICC RULES, supra note 19, at art. 4.4.
\textsuperscript{78} ICDR RULES, supra note 32, at art. R-53.
\textsuperscript{79} Id. at art. R-57.F.
\textsuperscript{80} CRCICA RULES, supra note 20, at art. 47.
\textsuperscript{81} ICDR RULES, supra note 32, at art. 36.
\textsuperscript{82} CAM RULES, supra note 6, at 15, art. 10.
\textsuperscript{83} TEHRAN REG’L ARBITRATION CTR., RULES OF ARBITRATION art. 36.4, http://www.trac.ir/DownloadFiles/TRAC%20Rules%20of%20Arbitration_Eng.pdf [hereinafter TRAC RULES].
KLRCA Rules authorize the arbitral tribunal to do so after consultation with the Director of the KLRCA.\(^84\) Also, Article 51.5 of the SCC authorizes the Secretariat of the SCC to give the opposing party a chance to make the required payments on behalf of the defaulting party.\(^85\) In practice, this is generally what happens as respondents by and large fail to make the payment. In line with this, DIS Rules give the Secretariat of the DIS the power to extend the time limit for payment of the administrative fee and the provisional advance. Failure to pay results in the termination of the proceedings.\(^86\) Article 4.7 of the HKIAC states this same rule.\(^87\)

Some institutional rules oblige the institution to dismiss the case if a party fails to pay its provisional share, unless the opposing party makes the due payment on the other’s behalf. Article 51(5) of the SCC Rules directs the Board of the SCC to end the proceedings, with no authority to suspend or discretionary power in this regard.\(^88\) Both the CRCICA and SIAC Rules authorize the institution, if a party fails to pay its shares of the proceeding, to ask the tribunal to suspend or dismiss the dispute.\(^89\) Article 37.6 of the ICC Rules authorize the Secretary General of the ICC Court to direct the tribunal to consider the claim waived where a party fails to make a payment.\(^90\)

It is worth mentioning that most institutional rules consider the decisions rendered by the institution’s competent authority final. For example, Article 7 of the SCC Rules stipulates that all decisions by the board of the SCC, including its decision on costs of arbitration, are final.\(^91\) Article 49.2 of the SCC Rules directs the arbitral tribunal to seek the Secretariat’s final calculation of the cost of arbitration, for inclusion within the final award.\(^92\) Addition-

\(^84\) KLRCA Rules, supra note 66, at r. 13.6.
\(^85\) SCC Rules, supra note 28, at art. 51.5.
\(^87\) HKIAC Rules, supra note 10, at art. 4.7.
\(^88\) SCC Rules, supra note 28, at art. 51.5:
If a party fails to make a required payment, the Secretariat shall give the other party an opportunity to do so within a specified period of time. If the payment is not made within that time, the Board shall dismiss the case in whole or in part. If the other party makes the required payment, the Arbitral Tribunal may, at the request of that party, make a separate award for reimbursement of the payment.\(^93\)
\(^89\) CRCICA Rules, supra note 20, at art. 47.2; SIAC Rules, supra note 52, at art. 36.3.
\(^90\) ICC Rules, supra note 19, at art. 37.6.
\(^91\) SCC Rules, supra note 28, art. 7.
\(^92\) Id. at art. 49.2.
ally, Article 34.7 of the 2016 SIAC Rules authorizes the Registrar of SIAC to make the final arbitration cost determination by the end of the proceedings.\textsuperscript{93} This differs from the CRCICA Rules, which do not expressly authorize the institution to make the final determination of the costs of the proceeding. Instead, Article 42.1 allows the arbitral tribunal to make such determination while consulting with, but not referring the matter to, CRCICA. This does not seem to prevent the tribunal from doing so, however. Considering the absence of an express statement of authority, any determination of CRCICA in this matter would accordingly not be final.\textsuperscript{94} Similarly, Article 34 of the ICDR authorizes solely the tribunal to fix the costs of arbitration in the award.\textsuperscript{95} In contrast, where the proceedings are terminated, Article 33.5 of the HKIAC authorizes both the tribunal and the HKIAC to determine the costs of the arbitration.\textsuperscript{96} Likewise, the QICC Rules contain similar provisions on the costs of the proceeding.\textsuperscript{97} Yet, while the DIAC Rules empowers the Executive Committee to decide on costs, the tribunal makes the final decision in the award. Still, the Executive Committee is to resolve any dissatisfaction with the tribunal's estimation of the costs. Likewise, the LCIA Rules vests the LCIA Court with the authority to determine the costs of the arbitration. Such determinations are final.\textsuperscript{98}

Somewhat unusually, the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules of 2013 authorize the Secretary-General of the PCA to revise an arbitral tribunal's decision on its fees and expenses, if the appointing authority failed to act, or if there is no appointing authority.\textsuperscript{99} In accordance with Article 41.3, the tribunal is to seek the appointing authority's approval to its determination of arbitration costs.\textsuperscript{100} However, where the tribunal has already made its determination within the final award, it is required to correct the award by adjusting the fees as determined by the PCA.\textsuperscript{101}

\textsuperscript{93} SIAC RULES, supra note 52, at art. 34.7.
\textsuperscript{94} CRCICA RULES, supra note 20, at art. 42.1.
\textsuperscript{95} ICDR RULES, supra note 32, at art. 34.
\textsuperscript{96} HKIAC RULES, supra note 10, at art. 33.5.
\textsuperscript{97} QICC RULES, supra note 25, at r. 43.
\textsuperscript{98} LCIA RULES, supra note 14, at arts.28.1, 29.1.
\textsuperscript{99} UNCITRAL RULES, supra, at arts. 41.4.b, 41.4.c.
\textsuperscript{100} Id. at art. 41.3.a.
\textsuperscript{101} Id. at art. 41.4.d.
6. The Scrutiny of Awards Serves the Role of Arbitral Institutions

There is a legitimate and indispensable expectation that arbitral tribunals ensure that their awards are enforceable. As a result, some institutions, such as the ICC, scrutinize the tribunals' awards. In fact, this scrutiny procedure under Article 34 of the ICC Rules is one of the most distinctive features of ICC arbitration.

Under ICC Article 34, tribunals send award decisions to the administrative body, i.e., the administrative court. The administrative court reviews the award to ensure it satisfies all the formal requirements to guarantee enforceability, and returns the award to the tribunal with suggestions. These suggestions might include comments on substantive issues. The 2013 SIAC Rules contain a provision similar to Article 34, with the Registrar empowered to scrutinize the award. Article 41 of the CAM Rules bestows the CAM's Court with identical authority. Similarly, Article 29.5 of the TRAC Rules directs arbitral tribunals to send the draft award to the TRAC administrative body for review. Revisions cover three issues: (1) the satisfaction of the award formalities under the Rules; (2) the assessment of the costs of the proceedings; and (3) issues related to the substance of the relevant dispute.

The ICAC Rules authorize the Secretariat to review only the awards' formal requirements. Article 35.3 of the QICCA Rules authorizes semi-scrutiny power: "[b]efore its issuance, the Director of the Centre shall verify the formal elements of the arbitral award before affixing the seal on it . . ." The Rules do not indicate the remedy if the award does not meet all formal elements; in practice, the Director must inform the arbitral tribunal of the missing formal requirement.

Overall, the authors consider this type of authority desirable; the filter of routine defects increases the award quality. For example, review protects arbitrators from potential liability where enforcement proceedings annul the award. Despite the advantages,

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102 ICC Rules, supra note 19, at art. 34.
103 Id. at 37, art. 34; see also Stephen R. Bond et al., ICC Rules of Arbitration, Awards, Article 33, in Concise International Arbitration 421 (Loukas A. Mistelis ed., 2d ed. 2015).
104 SIAC Rules, supra note 52, at art. 32.3 (stating the same principle in identical wording).
105 CAM Rules, supra note 6, at art. 41.
106 TRAC Rules, supra note 83, at art. 29.5.
107 ICAC Rules, supra note 29, at art. 42.1.
108 QICCA Rules, supra note 29, at art. 35.3.
109 Id.
most arbitration rules do not confer such review power on the arbitration institutions. Following our review of domestic court decisions in various jurisdictions, we strongly recommend extending this authority among other arbitration institutions.

III. LEGAL NATURE OF DECISION OF ARBITRAL INSTITUTIONS

A. Decisions of Arbitral Institution May or May Not be Subject to Judicial Review

There has been some controversy as to whether the decisions of arbitral institutions are subject to review in domestic courts. There is no consistent approach taken internationally. Approaches differ by jurisdiction and may also differ by the rules of arbitral institution. Moreover, one must distinguish between the potentially direct judicial review of an arbitral institution’s decision and the indirect judicial review, so to speak, when parties rely on the courts to get an award set aside for the actions of the arbitral institution. This Article focuses on the former: the potential for direct review through the courts.

To that end, we look at arbitration rules or national legislation that explicitly provide for court review and arbitration rules that ostensibly exclude it. We then discuss past cases in which arbitral institutions defended decisions before national courts. We propose both the nature of arbitral decisions and the arbitration rules’ explicit review waiver should determine reviewability by judicial courts.

1. The First Position: Arbitral Rules or National Legislation Subject: The Institution’s Decision to Appeal Before the Courts

In some national jurisdictions, legislation specifically subjects the institutions’ decisions, or a subset thereof, to review by the courts. The Swedish Arbitration Act authorizes domestic court review decisions regarding arbitrators’ fees.110 In Soyak International Construction & Investment Inc., the Swedish court granted partial reimbursement of the arbitrators’ fees based on unreasonableness

due to the award’s lack of sufficient reasoning.\textsuperscript{111} Section 34 of the Act also provides parties to arbitration proceedings the right of review of arbitral institution’s decision on arbitrator challenges.

If DIAC’s registrar finds that the relevant arbitration agreement is not valid, prior to the constitution of a tribunal, the DIAC Rules give the parties to the arbitration agreement the right to challenge DIAC’s decision.\textsuperscript{112} Likewise, Article 6.6 of the ICC Rules of Arbitration states

[W]here the parties are notified of the Court’s decision pursuant to Article 6.4 that the arbitration cannot proceed in respect of some or all of them, any party retains the right to ask any court having jurisdiction whether or not, and in respect of which of them, there is a binding arbitration agreement.”\textsuperscript{113}

This means that any decision by the ICC Court is final, except for decisions about the ambit of the arbitration agreement.\textsuperscript{114} Article 1.4 stipulates this general rule as follows: “[t]he decisions of the Court as to the appointment, confirmation, challenge or replacement of an arbitrator shall be final . . . ”\textsuperscript{115} Moreover, the competent court reviews the administrative court’s decision regarding the extent of the arbitration agreement or refusals to administer a dispute.\textsuperscript{116} The 2016 SIAC Rules emphasize the binding and final nature of SIAC’s decisions. Parties waive the right of appeal or review with respect to SIAC’s administrative bodies.\textsuperscript{117} The waiver expressly does not extend to other decisions, including arbitrator challenges, objections to arbitration agreements, or SIAC competency to administer an arbitration.\textsuperscript{118}

2. The Second Approach: Arbitral Institution Exclude the Possibility to Resort to National Courts

Most arbitration rules attempt to circumscribe the possibility for parties to resort to the courts to challenge the institution’s decisions. In the 1980s, a Syrian state-owned company brought a case

\textsuperscript{111} Nytt Juridiskt Arkiv [NJA] [Supreme Court Reports] 2008-12-3 Ö 4227-06 (Swed.) [hereinafter Soyak Case]; MEALEY’S INT’L ARB. REP. (2009) (with commentary by S. Jarvin & C. S Dorgan, Counsel for the Plaintiff in the proceeding).

\textsuperscript{112} DIAC RULES, supra note 8, at art. 6.2.

\textsuperscript{113} ICC RULES, supra note 19, at art. 6.6.

\textsuperscript{114} Id. at 8, at art. 1 (stating the administrating body of the ICC administers the resolution of disputes by arbitral tribunals).

\textsuperscript{115} ICC RULES, supra note 19, at art. 1.4.

\textsuperscript{116} ICC RULES, supra note 19, at art. 6.6.

\textsuperscript{117} SIAC RULES, supra note 52, at art. 40.2.

\textsuperscript{118} Id.
against the ICC before the French courts.\textsuperscript{119} The company sought annulment of the appointment of one member of an arbitral tribunal. The company’s main argument was based on breach of due process; the company argued the ICC decision qualified as “jurisdictional” in nature. However, the Paris Court of Appeal “qualified this decision as an acte de police de l’instance arbitrale [an administrative measure in the arbitral process] and held that it was thus not subject to the rules applying to jurisdictional decisions.”\textsuperscript{120} The court noted, “because of their administrative nature, decisions of arbitral institutions can neither be appealed nor be disputed through a court action.”\textsuperscript{121} The decision recognized the administrative nature of arbitration institutions’ decisions.

More recently, the Cairo Court of Appeal dismissed a claim challenging the presiding arbitrator in a pending CRCICA arbitration.\textsuperscript{122} In accordance with CRCICA Rules, the decisions on arbitrator challenges by the Advisory Committee are final and unchallengeable.\textsuperscript{123}

The claimant filed a petition before the Cairo Court of Appeal seeking annulment of the CRCICA decision dismissing the arbitrator’s challenge. The party sought an order of the Court disqualifying the presiding arbitrator. The claimant contended that Article 19 of the Egyptian Arbitration Act governed the challenge of arbitrators.\textsuperscript{124} This article empowers a competent court to decide on the challenge. The Cairo Court of Appeal held that,

[A]s a general rule and pursuant to Article 25 of the Egyptian Arbitration Act, the parties agreed to manage the proceeding according to CRCICA Arbitration Rules, this reflects their express agreement that these rules become the governing rules of

\textsuperscript{120} J.Y. Art, Challenge of Arbitrators: Is an Institutional Decision Final?, 2 ARB. INT’L 261, 261–65 (1986). In Société Opinter France v. Société Dacomex, the Court of Appeal of Paris similarly held that ICC Court decisions removing arbitrators were not jurisdictional decisions and that the ICC Court thus did not have to state the grounds on which those decisions were based. Id.
\textsuperscript{121} JEAN-FRANÇOIS POUDRUT & SÉBASTIEN BESSON, COMPARATIVE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 395 (2d ed. 2007).
\textsuperscript{122} Mahkamat al-Isti’naf [Court of Appeal], Cairo, case no. 393, session of 7 Dec. 2015, year 132.
\textsuperscript{123} CRCICA RULES, supra note 20, at art. 13.6, Bylaws of the Advisory Committee, Article 3(1)(c).
\textsuperscript{124} Mahkamat al-Isti’naf [Court of Appeal], Cairo, case no. 393, session of 7 Dec. 2015, year 132.
the proceeding. Hence, these rules become a part of the arbitration agreement. Therefore, the arbitral tribunal and the parties are bound by these rules...

Pursuant to Article 4 of the CRCICA Rules, the Advisory Committee of CRCICA is the proper authority to decide the challenge or disqualification of arbitrators. The Court concluded that,

[P]ending the arbitration proceeding, the judiciary does not have the power to decide upon the challenge of arbitrators, or to review, independently, any other decisions of CRCICA concerning the administration of the relevant proceeding. Yet, it is admissible to raise any claims related to the proceeding before the competent annulment court after settling the dispute via an award, as pursuant to the governing rules of annulment.

In summary, the parties waived any right they may have under national law to seek recourse to the court by agreeing to the CRCICA Rules. In addition, there is no such right under Egyptian law in line with Article 22.3 of the Egyptian Arbitration Act, which holds a party to arbitration dispute may not challenge a tribunal's decision before the issuance of a final award. In contrast to the French law cases, the Egyptian case did not address the nature of the institution's decision, but based the waiver solely on explicit Egyptian law and the implicit waiver in acceptance of CRCICA's arbitration rules.

Some arbitral rules specifically address the nature of their decisions. Per Article 29.1 of the LCIA Rules, the institution’s decisions are explicitly characterized as administrative, with the exception of those for arbitrator challenges. The latter's exclusion is, however, of no consequence to the LCIA's far reaching waivers, which exclude all recourse to national courts or other legal authority to the extent permitted by any applicable law. Moreover, the LCIA reserves for itself the right to act, in case a mandatory rule under national law undermines its exclusion clause. If a review or appeal of a LCIA decision is pursued due to an applicable mandatory domestic law provision, the LCIA explicitly reserves itself the right to decide whether the relevant arbitration dispute should continue or not.

125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Act No. 27 of 1994 (Egyptian Arbitration Act), art. 22.3.
128 LCIA Rules, supra note 14, at art. 29.1.
129 Id.
130 Id. at art. 29.2.
Not all institutions are that careful, and scholars continue to debate the nature of the decisions of arbitral institutions to consider whether they may be appealable before the courts or not.\textsuperscript{131} For instance, Jan Paulsson has asserted that:

[T]he question [ ] may arise whether, and to what extent, someone should police the police. Surely there ought to be some mechanism that could neutralize the decision of an institution, which is found to be a sham (perhaps not an unthinkable thought in an age of proliferating institutions amongst governance are dubious). And even in respect to well-known and reputable institutions, occasions may arise where a party feels impelled to test the legitimacy of a particular administrative decision. The greater the scope for such challenges, the greater the danger of subverting the very raison d'être of the institution.\textsuperscript{132}

The general understanding is that arbitration institutions' decisions are administrative in nature and are final, thus not subject to any judicial challenges. However, the arbitral institutions may be characterized as judicial in nature if the subject matter could have been decided by the arbitral tribunal, for example the assessment of whether an arbitration agreement is valid or not. This should make the relevant prima facie decision subject to domestic court review. If an arbitral institution refuses to proceed with an arbitration agreement in case it is found to be invalid, the parties can still refer their dispute to arbitration based on the same agreement. This would be the case, if the arbitration agreement is valid, as the arbitral institution decision does not have \textit{res judicata} effect.\textsuperscript{133} But allowing appeals on juridical decisions may cause:

the time-period for arbitrations [to] be vastly expended, or [ ] the membership of the supervising organ would be entirely replaced by career bureaucrats or institutional magistrates. Institutional arbitration would either become greatly more expensive (and thus more inaccessible to Third World litigants) or simply go out of business.\textsuperscript{134}

In the case of \textit{Global Gold Mining, LLC v. Peter M. Robinson et al.} ("Global Gold"),\textsuperscript{135} the U.S. District Court of Southern New

\textsuperscript{134} See Paulsson, \textit{supra} note 132.
York (the “Southern District”) also followed such reasoning when considering whether the decisions of arbitral institutions are appealable before state courts. The issue was whether a party at the seat of arbitration could request that the District Court compel the ICC Court to reverse its initial refusal to administer the case at hand. Global Gold filed a request for arbitration under the arbitral clause of a share purchase agreement between Global Gold and an Armenian mining company against the three signatories of the share agreement, and against the Armenian Environment Minister (the “Minister”). None of the respondents answered the request for arbitration, and the ICC partially rejected the case on a prima facie basis, as the arbitration agreement did not bind the Minister under the previous Article 6.2 of the ICC Rules. Global Gold filed a suit against the ICC Court in the New York state courts, which was later transferred to the Southern District at the request of the ICC. Global Gold claimed that the ICC had erred in its decision related to the Minister requesting a mandatory injunction from the court to compel the ICC Court to reverse its decision and refer the case to an arbitral tribunal for adjudication. The Southern District dismissed Global Gold’s petition because it had allegedly failed to address any claim in which relief could be granted. As the ICC had previously rejected jurisdiction over the Minister, Global Gold could not compel the ICC Court to refer the issue to the arbitral tribunal. However, it accepted the ICC’s argument that the appropriate remedy for Global Gold was to seek compelled arbitration against the Minister in a national court that had jurisdiction to hear the matter. The Southern District further observed “if administrative institutions such as the ICC or the ICC Court can be required to defend their decision in national courts of any country in the world, the expenses of defending such potential far-flung suits could constrain their judgment, increase the costs of arbitration procedures.”136 Thus, the case is authority to suggest that the ICC’s decisions are not subject to judicial review in the U.S.137

136 Id. at 448.
B. In Both Civil Law and Common Law, the Legal Nature of the Relationship Between Arbitral Institutions and Parties May be Considered a Contractual One

It is not only the legal nature of the institutions' decisions that determines the institutions' potential liability, but also the legal relation between the institution, the parties, and the arbitrators.

Although there is no international consensus, the legal nature of the relationship between arbitral institutions and parties is regularly considered a contractual one, often studied in the context of liability issues. One of the most important implications of the qualification of the relationship as contractual is the application of the general rules of contractual liability to any misconduct by the institution.\footnote{Kinga Timář, The Legal Relationship Between the Parties and the Arbitral Institution, ELTE L.J. (2013), http://eltelawjournal.hu/the-legal-relationship-between-the-parties-and-the-arbitral-institution/}

Common law and civil law systems have different, though similar, basic requirements for a contractual obligation to arise. Under civil law, generally, the parties' mutual consent is required when all relevant parties agree to a proposal, contract, or transaction. It is often referred to as a "meeting of the minds." By contrast, common law requires mutual assent and consideration. Mutual assent implies an agreement by both parties to the contract. Moreover, mutual assent must be proven objectively, and is often established by showing an offer and acceptance.\footnote{Mutual Assent, CORNELL L. SCH., LEGAL INFO. INST. https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/mutual-assent (last visited Oct., 2017).} A great portion of authorities maintains that there is a consensus between the parties and the institution "which is directed at the provision of administrative services in aid of the arbitral proceedings."\footnote{See Timář, supra note 138.} It has been suggested that even the consideration requirement is fulfilled as the institution undertakes to administer the arbitration between the parties, and the parties enter the obligation to pay the institution an administration fee.\footnote{Id.}

There are, however, several events that could possibly constitute the offer or the acceptance: (i) the release of the arbitration rules by the institution; (ii) the conclusion by the parties of the arbitration agreement containing a reference to the arbitration rules of the institution; (iii) the filing of the request for arbitration; (iv)
the service of the request for arbitration upon the respondent by the institution; or (v) the decision by the institution to set the proceedings in motion.\textsuperscript{142}

Most of the arbitral institutions offer their services via their arbitration rules. Philippe Fouchard suggested that:

\begin{quote}
[t]he offer will be made by the center (the publication of its Rules and its standard arbitration clauses constitutes an on-going offer). Acceptance takes place at the time when both parties insert this clause in their main contract. However, the contract between the center and the parties will only be concluded when notice of this acceptance reaches the party who made the offer at the time the claimant sends its request for arbitration to the center.\textsuperscript{143}
\end{quote}

As much as there is no clear consensus on the nature of the legal relationship between institutions and the parties, where scholars have opted to define the relationship as contractual, there is often no consensus as to what constitutes offer and acceptance of the contract.

\textbf{C. The Legal Nature of the Relationship Between the Arbitral Institution and the Arbitrators is Considered Contractual Across the Board}

The relationship between the institution and the arbitrators only arises once the arbitrators receive their mandate to represent the parties and it is usually considered contractual across the board.\textsuperscript{144}

The institution, pursuant to its rules or agreement of the parties, confirms the arbitrator appointed by the parties and also appoints the arbitrator if the parties cannot agree on the appointment of the sole arbitrator or the chairman of the tribunal. In that sense, the institution's appointment of arbitrators gives rise to a "contract to arbitrate." That contract may be terminated when replacement is inevitable. The arbitrator is bound to deliver the award to the arbitral institution and in exchange the arbitrator will receive fees

\textsuperscript{142} Id.


\textsuperscript{144} \textsc{Mauro Rubino-Sammartano}, \textit{International Arbitration Law and Practice} 417 (2d. ed. 2001).
for adjudicating the arbitration dispute.\textsuperscript{145} As the institution prescribes the scope, liability, remuneration, and advance payment of the arbitration, the institution can be construed to be a party to the parties' agreement with the arbitrator.\textsuperscript{146}

While a few scholars claim there is no legal relationship, most others suggest that such relationship is also based in contract.\textsuperscript{147} It is asserted that when the arbitral institution contracts as principal with the arbitrator, the contract is between the arbitrator and the institution. Thus, no contract exists between the arbitrators and the parties. Other commentators, however, claim that there is an additional contract between the parties and the arbitrators.\textsuperscript{148} More specifically, it is claimed that if the institution contracts as agent, the disputing parties would still be bound by that contract as the disclosed principal.\textsuperscript{149} Similarly, the relationship between the arbitral institution and the arbitrator is often described as a "contract of arbitral collaboration." Pursuant to the named contract, "each party promises and performs services for the benefit of the other and particular for the benefit of third parties (the parties to the arbitration)."

\textbf{D. National Positions Vary on the Nature of the Relationship of Institutions, Arbitrators and Parties}

As previously addressed, in crude terms, the civil law approach differs from the common law approach. Accordingly, the two categories of systems have different perspectives on the nature, liability, and consequences of referring a dispute to an arbitration institution. However, even within each legal tradition, approaches may differ vastly. Hence, in this section, we briefly illustrate different domestic positions regarding the nature of the relationship between arbitral institution and the parties, as well as the pertinent case law.

\textsuperscript{145} Id.
\textsuperscript{146} See Schütze, supra note 2, at 17.
\textsuperscript{148} Id. at 44.
\textsuperscript{149} Id.
\textsuperscript{150} See generally Kun Fan, Arbitration in China: A Legal and Cultural Analysis (2013).
1. England & Wales: The Arbitral Institution and the Parties Enter Into a Contract

Under English law, the relationship between the parties and the arbitral institution is considered contractual in nature. The duty of the arbitral institution arising under such contract is the duty to perform its tasks with the care due of a professional. This understanding is reflected in Article 32.1 of the LCIA Rules, which obliges the LCIA Court to act in good faith at all times: "for all matters not expressly provided in the Arbitration Agreement, the LCIA Court, the LCIA, the Registrar, the Arbitral Tribunal and each of the parties shall act at all times in good faith . . . ".

2. Spain: The Parties and the Arbitral Institution Enter a Hybrid Contract Reflecting Both a Service Contract and a Mandate

Under Spanish law, the contract between the arbitral institution and the parties has a hybrid character in the sense that it contains characteristics of both a mandate and services contract. The arbitral institution agrees to administer the arbitration and appoint the arbitrators in exchange for certain agreed fees or tariffs. The Spanish Arbitration Act fails to provide a deadline by which the arbitral institution must accept the administration of the proceeding or the appointment of the arbitrators. Having said that, the prevailing view is that the parties authorize the respective appointing authority to conclude a contract with an arbitrator on their behalf when entering into an arbitration agreement.

Under Spanish law, the arbitral institution and the arbitrators have a guarantee and control relationship. The former is the guarantor of the proper performance of the later. At a disciplinary level, the arbitral institution is also controller of the quality of its decisions.

The relationship between the arbitrator and the arbitral institution has special features when the institution appoints the arbitrator. The arbitrator is likely to be employed or at least closely associated with the institution; for instance, he or she may be on its roster. The arbitrator, therefore, either has an express contract or

152 Id.
153 Id.
is deemed to have an implied contractual relationship with the institution. Of paramount importance, there is a tripartite relationship between the parties who submit their dispute to arbitration, the arbitrator himself and the arbitral institution. For instance, any arbitrator serving under the auspices of the CAM agrees that the CAM will be entitled to 10% of the arbitrator’s fees, which will be invoiced after the close of the proceedings. Certain rules may be applicable to all the players of the proceedings regardless of their relationship. For instance, Article 26 of the Rules of the CAM establishes a provision setting forth a general principle of good faith in the proceeding applicable to all participants.

3. Egypt: The Relationship Between the Arbitral Institution and the Parties Has Not Been Explicitly Categorized but May Be Assumed to Be Contractual in Line with Sharia Principles

The nature of the relationship between arbitral institutions and the parties to the arbitration proceedings and the arbitrators and parties is in controversy in Egypt.\(^{154}\) Egyptian law does not address the matter explicitly. Principles of Sharia form the basic source of legislation under the Egyptian Constitution.\(^{155}\) Courts apply Sharia principles in cases of legal lacuna.\(^{156}\) According to some scholars’ understanding of Sharia, the relationship between arbitrators and parties is a contractual bond.\(^{157}\) Hence, under Egyptian law, contract theory may potentially extend to the relationship between arbitral institutions and parties.

The parties’ obligation to reimburse arbitrators for their services as adjudicators in their dispute is in line with this contractual understanding. Therefore, most arbitration rules employed in Egypt refer to the authority of arbitrators to suspend the proceeding if a party fails to pay a reasonable portion of the costs of the proceeding, including the arbitrators’ fees, during the course of the proceedings. On the other hand, arbitrators serve the same role as domestic court judges: to uphold the rule of law and efficiency in the proceeding. Otherwise, the competent arbitral institution, based on a party’s request, would be able to replace the arbitrator


\(^{156}\) Civil Code, art. 1 (Egypt).

\(^{157}\) Samir Saleh, Commercial Arbitration in the Arab Middle East: Shari’a, Syria, Lebanon, and Egypt 21 (2d ed. 1984).
who fails to participate as desired by the party.\textsuperscript{158} Furthermore, arbitrators must disclose any circumstances that might raise doubts as to their independence and impartiality.\textsuperscript{159} This obligation starts with the signing of the statement of acceptance to serve as arbitrator and lapses with the end of the proceedings. As the arbitrator’s function is like a judge’s, arbitrators do not expect to be liable for their role in the settlement of disputes. There have not been many suits against arbitrators in Egypt, but arbitrators have exceptionally been held liable if they intentionally commit an act of gross negligence that negatively affects the arbitration, or its parties. The Egyptian Civil Code has identified cases of gross negligence with respect to judges, and its definition of gross negligence applies to the relationship between arbitrators and disputant parties. The Egyptian Court of Cassation previously held that a judge was to be considered negligent if the judge acted for personal advantage or to enable one of the parties to the dispute to gain undue benefit. Gross negligence was present, if he intended to cause severe damage to one of the disputants.\textsuperscript{160}

4. Germany: Arbitral Institution’s Contract

German jurisprudence and scholarship supports the contract theory whereby the parties to the arbitration are understood to have entered an unwritten “arbitral institution’s contract”\textsuperscript{161} whose subject is the administration function of the arbitral institution.\textsuperscript{162} Since the German Civil Code (the “BGB”) subdivides contracts into categories, the arbitral institution’s contract is to fall within one such category. However, jurisprudence and scholars have thus far been unable to decide under which category the contract between parties and arbitration institution falls: an agency agreement, a service agreement, or an instruction. In contrast, jurisprudence and scholars agree that the contract between arbitrator and arbitral institution is a service contract.\textsuperscript{163}

Under the German contract theory, offer and acceptance form the arbitral institution’s contract. The majority view suggests that

\textsuperscript{158} CRCICA Arbitration Rules, supra note 20, at art. 14; Act No. 27 of 1994 (Egyptian Arbitration Act), art. 20 (Egypt).

\textsuperscript{159} Act No. 27 of 1994 (Egyptian Arbitration Act), art. 16.3 (Egypt).

\textsuperscript{160} Mahkamat al-Naqd [Court of Cassation], case no. 1236, session of 29 Mar. 1987 (Egypt); Mahkamat al-Naqd [Court of Cassation], case no. 22936, session of 9 July 2003 (Egypt).

\textsuperscript{161} In German, “Schiedsorganisationvertrag”.


\textsuperscript{163} Id.
the parties make the offer by submitting the dispute to arbitration under the auspices of the arbitral institutions, and the arbitral institution accepts such offer by commencing the dispute administration.\textsuperscript{164} The minority suggests publication and advertisement of the arbitration rules by an arbitral institution is a binding offer to potential dispute parties, and the claimant accepts the offer by submitting the dispute to arbitration on behalf of both parties. In analogy, the arbitrator makes the offer by agreeing to arbitrate the dispute, and the institution accepts the appointment when confirming it.\textsuperscript{165}

5. Sweden: The Relationship Between Arbitral Institutions and the Parties is Contractual

The Swedish legal system, a hybrid of common and civil law,\textsuperscript{166} affirms the contractual nature of the relationship between arbitrators and the parties, as well as between arbitral institutions and parties. Swedish law allows arbitrators to file a claim for reimbursement once they have rendered an award.\textsuperscript{167} In \textit{Ad Vadis S.A vs. Royal Unable}, the Svea Court of Appeal reviewed the SCC decision on appointment of arbitrators.\textsuperscript{168} Appellants claimed the SCC did not follow its own rules; a procedural error requiring a setting aside proceeding. Additionally, appellant alleged the SCC breached the equal treatment principle, in breach of Article 13.4.\textsuperscript{169} The Svea Court dismissed the claim, concluding the appointment of arbitrators did not violate Article 13.4 or the principle of equal treatment. The Stockholm District Court refused to review a SCC decision concerning the challenge of an arbitrator. The Court held the SCC has exclusive authority to decide the challenge and the SCC decision is final. Hence, the Court concluded it did not have jurisdiction to review the claim.\textsuperscript{170} Section 41 of the Swedish Arbitration Act does provide for judicial review of arbitrator’s fees, if the arbitrators themselves did not estimate the fees.\textsuperscript{171}

\textsuperscript{164} \textit{Id.} at 2840; see also FRIEDRICH STEIN & MARTIN JONAS, \textsc{Kommentar Zur Zivilprozessordnung} (23rd ed. 2014) §1025, side note 15; WOLFGANG KRÜGER & THOMAS RAUSCHER, \textsc{Münchener Kommentar zur Zivilprozessordnung: ZPO, Vol. 3} (3d ed. 2017), anterior comment to §1034, side note 69–74.

\textsuperscript{165} \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{166} \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{167} \textsc{Swedish Arbitration Act} (SFS 1999:116).

\textsuperscript{168} Svea Hovrätt (HovR) (Svea Court of Appeal) 2015-04-28 Ö 8043-13 (Swed).

\textsuperscript{169} \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{170} Svea Hovrätt (HovR) (Svea Court of Appeal) 2015-04-30 Ö 860-04 (Swed.).

\textsuperscript{171} Nytt Juridiskt Arkiv [NJA] [Supreme Court Reports] 2008-12-3 Ö 4227-06 (Swed.).
et al. vs. Soyak International Construction and Investment Inc., the SCC, not the arbitrators, estimated the arbitrators’ fees.\textsuperscript{172} Accordingly, the Svea Court of Appeal decided to dismiss a claim for non-admissibility of a claim to review arbitrator’s fees. A competent court has jurisdiction to review estimation of the arbitrators’ fees pursuant to Section 41.

6. France: The Relationship is Governed by a Hybrid Contract Characteristic of a Mandate and a \textit{Contract d'Entreprise}

In France, the contract between arbitral institution and the parties has a mixed character, similar in nature to a mandate (mandate agreement) and a \textit{contract d'entreprise}.\textsuperscript{173} As already stated, the decisions taken by the ICC regarding the conduct of the proceeding and the composition of the arbitral tribunal are administrative in nature. They do not involve the exercise of judicial power (the resolution of a dispute between the parties). Accordingly, administrative decisions are part of the institutional role that the ICC Court must play to organize and supervise the arbitration according to the will of the parties. This approach has been endorsed by French jurisprudence under \textit{Raffineries de Pétrole d'Homs et de Banias v. Chambre de Commerce Internationale\textsuperscript{174}} and Société Opinter France v Société Dacomex.\textsuperscript{175}

IV. \textbf{WHEREAS INSTITUTIONS INCLUDE FAR REACHING IMMUNITY CLAUSES, LIABILITY MAY NEVERTHELESS ATTACH TO THEIR ACTIONS}

Parties dissatisfied with the outcome of the arbitration have occasionally tried to recover damages from arbitral institutions or from the arbitrators, seeking reimbursement of the arbitration costs, or the cost of setting aside or resisting enforcement.\textsuperscript{176} In

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{172} Svea Hovrätt (HovR) (Svea Court of Appeal) 2015-09-25 Ö 1952-05 (Swed.).
\item \textsuperscript{173} The \textit{mandat} and the \textit{contrat d'entreprise} are regulated in \textit{Code Civil} [C. Civ.] \textit{[Civil Code]} art. 1779 (Fr.) and \textit{Code Civil} [C. Civ.] \textit{[Civil Code]} art. 1984 (Fr.).
\item \textsuperscript{176} See Schütze, \textit{supra} note 2.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
some instances, institutions have been held liable. As a case in point, the Nanterre First Instance Court held an arbitral institution liable for breach of a contract. The Court found that the institution undertook under its institutional rules to send the parties’ pleadings to the arbitral tribunal. Such undertaking represented a contractual guaranty to comply with due process. Hence, the institution’s failure to forward a party’s pleadings to the tribunal amounted to a breach of due process.

Arbitral institutions usually include a liability waiver in their rules. For example, the ICC Rules waive the liability of arbitrators, the ICC, ICC employees, and any person appointed by the arbitral tribunal. Scholars have, however, claimed that institutions do not need absolute immunity to protect arbitrators and arbitral independence. Moreover, in many jurisdictions it remains unsettled whether the institutional waivers are valid at all.

A. Most Arbitral Institutions Exclude Their Liability in Their Arbitration Rules or Bylaws

Most rules of arbitral institutions attempt to explicitly exclude or limit their potential liability. Differences in the scope of the exclusion exist, generally reflecting liability exclusions restricted by the law of the seat of the institution. This section provides a short overview of the contractual exclusions of major institutions, whereas Section IV, subsection B analyses the legality of liability exclusions in several jurisdictions.

Some arbitration rules attempt to exclude the liability of the arbitral institution entirely; Article 49 of the CAM Rules gives wide exclusion of liability to the CAM and its staff, except for willful misconducts. Likewise, Article 40 of the DIAC Rules extends the immunity to experts of the tribunal. Section 44 of the DIS Rules provides similar exclusion of liability to the DIS and its employees, while extending exclusion to arbitrators as well. Likewise, Article 17 of the QICCA includes a similar exclusion. Similarly,
Part II of the Arbitration Rules of KLRCA excludes the institution’s liability for “any act or omission related to the conduct of the arbitral proceedings.”\textsuperscript{182} Its sister institution, the RCICAL mirrors the KLRCA’s complete exclusion of liability clause.\textsuperscript{183} The 2013 SIAC Rules likewise stipulate that the SIAC “shall not be liable to any person for any negligence, act or omission about any arbitration governed by these Rules.”\textsuperscript{184} The DIAC Rules exclude the liability of the Centre without limitation.\textsuperscript{185} The ICSID Convention provides the furthest reaching immunity of any arbitration institution. The Convention grants ICSID complete “immunity from all legal process except when the Centre [itself] waives this immunity.”\textsuperscript{186}

Although some institutional rules strive to exclude the institution’s liability for all acts or omissions, some institutional rules reflect that domestic laws may not permit such blanket waivers. The ICC Rules fall into this category by specifying that it “shall not be liable to any person for any act or omission in connection with the arbitration, except to the extent such limitation of liability is prohibited by applicable law.”\textsuperscript{187} The ICC position can be understood in light of the French law position that such contractual waivers are null and void. The qualification thus tries to preserve the waiver of liability to the fullest extent permissible by the applicable law, rather than rendering it void in its entirety. For example, the contractual waiver would be void under German law for intentional acts only. The ICDR Rules mirror the ICC Rules’ wording of limitation of exclusion,\textsuperscript{188} as do the VIAC Rules 2013. The VIAC Rules exclude the liability of the Austrian Federal Economic Chamber, “to the extent legally permissible.”\textsuperscript{189}

Other arbitral rules do not go as far, but adapt their institutional rules to the national law position, under which liability for intentional acts, bad faith or fraud often cannot be excluded. For instance, Article 38 of the ICDR Rules states: “except to the extent that such a limitation of liability is prohibited by applicable law.” In this vein, the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, often considered the blueprint for arbitration rules, suggest that “save for inten-

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{182} KLRCA Rules, supra note 66, at r. 16.2.
  \item \textsuperscript{183} RCICAL Arbitration Rules, supra note 40, at art. 22.
  \item \textsuperscript{184} SIAC Rules 2013, supra note 52, at arts. 38.2, 34.1.
  \item \textsuperscript{185} DIAC Rules, supra note 8, at art. 40.
  \item \textsuperscript{186} ICSID Convention, supra note 30, at art. 20.
  \item \textsuperscript{187} ICC Rules, supra note 19, at art. 41.
  \item \textsuperscript{188} ICDR Rules, supra note 32, at art. 38.
  \item \textsuperscript{189} VIAC Rules, supra note 38, at art. 46.
\end{itemize}
tional wrongdoing, the parties waive, to the fullest extent permitted under the applicable law, any claim against . . . the appointing authority . . . based on any act or omission in connection with the arbitration.”

The Arbitration Rules of CRCICA and QICCA use the wording of the UNCITRAL Rules (2010) and exclude “intentional wrongdoings.” While the wording differs slightly, the ICAC Rules come to the same result: waiving the center’s liability for acts in connection with any arbitration dispute “unless . . . proven to be premeditated.”

Some institutions add gross negligence to the list of acts or omissions not covered by their exclusion provision. For example, the Arbitration Rules of DIS, Germany’s premier arbitral institution, exclude liability for DIS acts “in connection with arbitral proceedings . . . provided such acts do not constitute an intentional or grossly negligent breach of duty.” Under the SCC Rules, liability is excluded “for any act or omission in connection with the arbitration unless such act or omission constitutes willful misconduct or gross negligence.” Similarly, the Swiss Rules of International Arbitration guarantee the immunity of the Swiss Chambers’ Arbitration Institution “except if the act or omission is shown to constitute intentional wrongdoing or gross negligence.”

The LCIA Rules 2014 combine the carve-out for conscious and deliberate wrongdoing and prohibitions of applicable laws. The LCIA Rules 2014 state “the LCIA . . . shall be liable to any party howsoever for any act or omission in connection with any arbitration, save: (i) where the act or omission is shown by that party to constitute conscious and deliberate wrongdoing committed by the body or person alleged to be liable to that party; or (ii) to the extent that any part of this provision is shown to be prohibited by any applicable law.”

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191 CRCICA Rules, supra note 20, at arts. 16, 17.
192 ICAC Rules, supra note 29, at art. 47.
193 DIS Rules, supra note 86, at sec. 44.2.
194 SCC Rules, supra note 28, at art. 52.
196 LCIA Rules, supra note 14, at art. 31.1.
indicates the offending acts would have to be both conscious and deliberate for the contractual waiver to be held inapplicable.\footnote{197}{Maxi Scherer et al., Arbitrating Under the 2014 LCIA Rules: A User’s Guide 375 (2015).}

The ICDR is an American Institution and specifically considers the deposition and subpoena practice in the U.S. legal system. The ICDR Rules contain explicit waivers in which the parties to the arbitration agree that arbitrators or institution personal have no obligation to make any statements about the arbitration. Furthermore, “no party shall seek to make any of these persons a party or witness in any judicial or other proceedings relating to the arbitration.”\footnote{198}{ICDR Rules, supra note 32, at art. 38.} Unsurprisingly, the waiver language under the AAA rules is identical. The LCIA Rules\footnote{199}{LCIA Rules, supra note 14, at art. 31.2.} and HKIAC Rules\footnote{200}{HKIAC Rules, supra note 10, at art. 43.2.} make similar provisions, restricted in time to “after the award has been made and the possibilities of correction, interpretation and additional awards . . . have lapsed or been exhausted.”\footnote{201}{See TRAC Rules, supra note 83.}

The TRAC is the only institution that does not limit or exclude its liability in its Arbitration Rules or elsewhere.\footnote{201}{See TRAC Rules, supra note 83.}

**B. Some Institutional Waivers May be Void Under National Laws**

Although the previous section indicates that most arbitral institutions across the world attempt to exclude their liability in their arbitration rules to a varying degree, the effectiveness of the exclusions depend on whether they are given legal effect by the courts in which the relevant proceedings against the institution are started. Often those courts look at the specific nature of the obligations arbitral institutions assume to rule on the validity of the contractual waivers. As analyzed in Section III(A) above, one such example is post-award scrutiny of arbitral awards, where the obligations assumed vary from one arbitral institution to another. Whereas the ICC provides for an extensive revision process to ensure the quality of its awards, other institutions’ review is minimal, sometimes non-existent and more restricted to administrative as opposed to judicial tasks.
As we have seen in Section IV(A), the contractual waivers in the arbitration rules of arbitral institutions are often mirrored in national laws. In line with the general crude division of legal systems into civil law and common law jurisdictions, the authors suggest that the basis for granting immunity originates in common law systems' understanding that the arbitrator fulfills quasi-judicial functions and accordingly should also enjoy immunity from suit. This understanding is, however, also found in the national law of several civil law jurisdictions, where the contractual nature of the legal relationship between (1) the arbitrator and parties; (2) the parties and the arbitral institution; and (3) the arbitral institution and the arbitrator is emphasized. In jurisdictions where jurisprudence and scholarship support the contract theory, no automatic immunity is granted to arbitrator and arbitral institutions. Instead, it has been regularly proposed that any exclusions of liability that exist should be only available for quasi-judicial acts of arbitral institutions, such as the review of arbitral awards or the decision to find the institution competent pursuant to an arbitration agreement to administer the proceedings, but not for purely administrative acts. None of the institutional rules reviewed makes such a distinction.

An argument in favor of providing immunity to arbitrators and arbitral institutions suggests that the parties' assent to the institutional rules estops them from suing the arbitration institution and the arbitrator as unconscionable. The estoppel arguments may be particularly convincing in common law jurisdictions, in which the doctrine originates.

C. Common Law and Civil Law Approaches Differ Considerably as to Whether Arbitral Institutions are Immune from Suit for Their Actions

To get a better understanding of the differences, this section looks at a cross section of jurisdictions to consider their stand on the contractual liability waivers in arbitral institution rules.

In the common law, arbitral immunity stems from judicial immunity. Two early 17th century English cases, *Floyd v. Barker* and *Marshalsea*, are considered the origin of the notion. In those cases, Lord Coke elaborated on the rule of judicial immunity, stat-

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ing its purposes and limitations. Quoting a group of scholars, "judges of courts of record are not liable for damages for their decisions, the rule’s purposes are to ensure finality of judicial decisions, preserve judicial independence, and maintain confidence in the judicial system."\(^{203}\)

The matter differs in civil law jurisdictions. Some countries, such as Germany, also affirm arbitral immunity, but ground this finding in the implicit agreement of the parties that arbitrators should enjoy the same immunity as judges.\(^{204}\) Other civil law jurisdictions, such as France, do not grant strict immunity.\(^{205}\)

1. Civil Law: No Outright Quasi-Judicial Immunity is Accorded to Arbitral Institutions Since Their Relationship with the Parties is Contractual

i. France: Arbitral Institutions May be Liable

Philippe Fouchard stated “the contract between the center and the parties will . . . be concluded when notice of this acceptance reaches the party who made the offer, that is to say, at the time the claimant sends its request for arbitration to the center.”\(^{206}\) Thus, arbitral institutions are parties to a contract with the parties to the dispute, and accordingly, they should prima facie be liable for the proper performance of the contract.

In *Société Cubic Defense Systems, Inc. v CCI*, (“Cubic v CCI”) the Paris Court of Appeal deemed the exclusion of liability clause not to exist, because it aimed at absolving the institution of responsibility for its essential obligations.\(^{207}\) The ICC, pursuant to its rules, was obligated to provide an effective and efficient arbitration, suitable screening for impartial arbitrators, and a more involved oversight of the arbitral process. The Court of Cassation overturned the Court of Appeals’ finding: the ICC could not be held liable for shortcomings in the arbitrators’ reasoning and for their failure to consider European Union competition law. Accordingly, the ICC had properly performed the contract.

Similarly, in *SNF v Chambre de Commerce Internationale*, the Paris Court of Appeal held that the ICC was not liable despite its

\(^{203}\) Id. at 240.

\(^{204}\) Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Oct. 6, 1954, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift [NJW] 1763, 1954 (Ger.).

\(^{205}\) Tribunal de Grand Instance [TGI] [ordinary court of original jurisdiction] Nanterre, 1ère Chambre, July 1, 2010, 07-13724 (Fr) [http://www.cabinet-tonin.com/photos/0550-0001.pdf].

\(^{206}\) See FOUCHARD, GAILLARD, GOLDMAN, *supra* note 154.

\(^{207}\) Fouchard, *supra* note 143. The case at hand was the Judgment of 22 January 2009.
refusal to approve an award, which the claimant alleged was in breach of public policy. The Court further held that the ICC limitation of liability clause was invalid, as it allowed the ICC to avoid its duty to conduct the proceeding in an efficient way. More specifically, the waiver of liability found at Article 34 of the 1998 ICC Rules was considered null and void under French law because it allowed the institution to evade its fundamental obligation to organize an efficient arbitration. Following the judgment, ICC adopted a more cautious exclusion strategy in its 2012 Rules. In that sense, Article 40 of the ICC Rules entirely excludes the liability of the arbitrators, the ICC Court and its members, the ICC, its employees and national committees, unless the applicable law prohibits such waiver.

Despite the absence of outright immunity, there are only a few cases in which arbitral institutions were held liable. One such case is Société Filature Française de Mohair v. Fédération Française d'Industries Lainières et Cotonnières. In that case, the court held the arbitral institution liable because the award was based on a piece of documentary evidence which the arbitral institution ordered to be produced by its own initiative, thus violating the principe du contradicteur (adversarial principle) of French law. Moreover, the institution had failed to perform the contract entered into with the Spanish party.

ii. Egypt: Only Where the Institution is an International Organization, it is Immune from Suit

Egyptian law does not expressly address the status of arbitral institutions in Egypt. However, CRCICA, the leading arbitral institution in Egypt, was established pursuant to an international agreement between the Asian African Legal Consultative Organization (AALCO) and the Egyptian Government in 1987. Pursuant to this Agreement, CRCICA is an international organization endowed with immunities and privileges. In line with other international organizations, CRCICA enjoys immunity for acts iure imperii that relate closely to its mandate. Whereas, no immunity attaches to its acts iure gestionis, e.g. ancillary commercial activi-

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208 See Scherer, supra note 197, at 377.
209 This remains the case under the 2016 Rules.
211 CRCICA Rules, supra note 20.
ties, such as contracting with some corporation for appliances. In 1993, the Egyptian Court of Cassation dismissed a claim against an international organization, concerning its local office, which had previously concluded an agreement with the Egyptian state for lack of jurisdiction on account of immunity.\(^{213}\) In line with this approach, CRCICA’s special status as an international organization has been confirmed by the Cairo Court of Appeal, which held that it has no jurisdiction over CRCICA. Specifically, it ruled that CRCICA is protected from lawsuits brought against it whilst administering arbitral proceedings and exercising its functions as an arbitral institution.\(^{214}\) So, where arbitral institutions are classified as international organizations, they enjoy immunity from suit to the extent necessary for the institution to pursue its mandate. However, where this is not the case, no general immunity attaches.

iii. Spain: Institutions May Only be Held Liable for Their Actions If They Acted in Bad Faith, Recklessly or with Mens Rea

Article 21.1 of the Spanish Arbitration Act deals with the liability of the arbitrators and arbitral institutions when failing to comply with their duties. They may be held liable for the damages and losses they cause by reason of bad faith, recklessness or mens rea.\(^{215}\) In line with this, persons sitting as arbitrators in Spain must now hold liability insurance as introduced by Act 11/2011 (the “Spanish Arbitration Act”). If an arbitrator fails to have liability insurance, the arbitral institution is bound to pursue liability insurance on the arbitrator’s behalf. To the authors’ knowledge, there is no case law on this requirement. Arbitrators may be held liable to pay damages arising out of the termination and continuation of their duty. For instance, a premature termination of the arbitrator contract may also accrue a claim for additional fees for a replacement arbitrator. Having said that, we have failed to find any case law in that regard.

\(^{213}\) Mahkamat al-Naqd [Court of Cassation], case no. 2248, session of 9 Dec. 1993 (Egypt); Mahkamat al-Naqd [Court of Cassation], case no. 2332, session of 24 Mar. 1994 (Egypt).
\(^{214}\) Mahkamat al-Isti’naf [Court of Appeal], Cairo, case no. 32, session of 6 June 2012, year 128 (Egypt).
\(^{215}\) Spanish Arbitration Act art. 21.1 (B.O.E. 2011, 121) (Spain) (“Acceptance obliges the arbitrators and, where applicable, the arbitral institution to comply faithfully with their responsibilities, being, if they do not do so, liable for the damage and losses they cause by reason of bad faith, recklessness or fraud. Where the arbitration is entrusted to an arbitral institution, the injured party shall have a direct action against the institution, regardless of any actions for compensation available against the arbitrators.”).
A noteworthy case is *Delforca 2008 S.V., S.A. v. Consejo Superior de Cámaras Oficiales de Comercio Industria y Navegación*. The plaintiff requested damages from the Spanish Court of Arbitration for losses caused by the latter's alleged reckless conduct of the Spanish Court of Arbitration proceedings. As for the alleged reckless conduct, it was proven that one of the writs, which was apparently submitted on March 21st, was indeed submitted on March 25th. Moreover, some of the writs contained correction fluid in the numbering of the input records. Additionally, the Order of June 19, 2009 had two registration numbers as the log entry evidenced.

According to the High Court of Madrid however, despite the proceedings having been conducted in a careless and lax manner, they were not proven to have been conducted with willful misconduct or bad faith, and therefore not negligent enough to amount to "recklessness" under Article 21 of the Spanish Arbitration Act.

iv. Germany: It is Likely that Immunity Does Not Attach to Administrative Errors of Arbitral Institutions

Under German law, the obligations of the arbitral institutions towards the parties and the arbitrator to the dispute are understood to be found in the arbitral rules. Where the institution violates any of its obligations, liability may arise under § 280 I 2 of the German Civil Code (the "BGB") (as well as in special cases under §§ 280 II, 286 I), unless covered by privilege. In contrast to England, there are no statutory rules explicitly granting immunity to arbitral institutions. In fact, there are no provisions dealing with the liability of arbitrators and arbitral institutions under the BGB. However, it has been suggested that arbitral institutions should enjoy the qualified immunity from suit afforded to arbitrators. Arbitrator privilege is deduced by semi-analogous application of BGB § 839 II, which grants members of the judiciary immunity from suit for judicial acts, but not administrative acts (for which liability falls to the state in accordance with BGB § 839 I in connection with Article 34 S. 1 Basic Law). Whereas the German Su-

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216 T.C., Sept. 23, 2014 (R.J., No. 409) (Spain).
217 Id.
218 Id.
219 See Risse & Reiser, supra note 162, at 2842.
220 Id.
221 In German, "Spruchrichterprivileg".
preme Court denied that an arbitrator should enjoy privilege in analogy with BGB § 839 II, it was implied that it is the parties’ intention that arbitral tribunals seized of the dispute are afforded the same privileges as judges, i.e. the immunity arises out of the arbitral institution’s contract.\textsuperscript{223} Like judges, however, arbitrators are not immune from administrative errors, unless the relevant arbitral rules explicitly exclude liability for such acts. This is generally the case.

There have thus far been no cases regarding whether arbitral institutions can rely on the same quasi-analogy with judicial immunity as arbitrators. Scholars disagree on the question. It has been suggested that arbitral institutions only fulfill administrative functions, none of which are of a judicial nature.\textsuperscript{224} As we have seen in Section II, this is however not necessarily the case, as acts such as: the appointment or replacement of an arbitrator; the refusal to accept the appointment of an arbitrator on account of conflict of interest; and, the decision to accept or reject the challenge of an arbitrator, are all acts of judicial or quasi-judicial nature. Some scholars accordingly suggest that in direct analogy with the partial immunity of judges under BGB § 839 II, arbitral institutions enjoy a waiver of liability for acts of judicial nature but not for purely administrative ones. The existence of this grey zone makes the inclusion of contractual waivers in arbitral rules all the more important.

The effectiveness of the contractual waiver under German law is not guaranteed, but qualified. Pursuant to BGB § 276 III, liability cannot be waived for intentional acts. Further, arbitral rules may be considered standard terms. Their use is regulated and subject to the review of its content under BGB §§ 305 et seq.\textsuperscript{225} Accordingly, wherever German law is applicable, the contractual liability waivers in the arbitral rules of an institution must be reviewed for content. For example, BGB § 307 II No. 2, which prohibits waivers for breaches of material obligations,\textsuperscript{226} is relevant

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{223} Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Oct. 6, 1954, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 1763, 1954 (Ger.).
\item \textsuperscript{224} See Risse & Reiser, supra note 162, at 2842; KOMMENTAR ZUR Zivilprozessordnung §1035 ln. 25 (Musielak & Voit, eds.); diff. SCHWAB & WALTER, SChiedsgerichtsbarkeit ch. 12 ln. 9, (7th ed. 2005); CHRISTIAN WOLF, Die Institutionelle handelsschiedsgerichtsbarkeit 258, 266 (1992).
\item \textsuperscript{225} In German, “Inhaltskontrolle”.
\item \textsuperscript{226} In German, “Kardinals pflichten”.
\end{itemize}
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Material obligations are obligations essential to the contract, such as delivering the request for arbitration to the defendant. Where the party to the dispute is a natural person, and not a business, BGB § 306 II would suggest that the waiver is null and void in its entirety in regards to material breaches. However, where the party to the dispute is a business, which is generally the case, the waiver is valid if it is in line with applicable business customs (BGB § 310 I 2). Further, the requirement of good faith in BGB § 307 I 1 may temper the party’s ability to rely on the potential nullity of the contractual liability waiver in the arbitral rules.

v. Switzerland: Institutions are Likely Liable for Acts of Gross Negligence

Swiss law does not independently address the issue of arbitrator or arbitral institution immunity in respect of proceedings seated in Switzerland. However, it is generally understood that the relationship between the parties and arbitrators is contractual, the so-called receptum arbitri, i.e. the commitment to decide the dispute. The same is said to apply to the relationship between the parties and the arbitration institution. Based on such interpretation, Swiss law permits the exclusion of liability of arbitral institutions for simple negligence. Yet, pursuant to Article 100.1 of the Swiss Code of Obligation, the exclusion of liability for gross contractual negligence is null and void. The Federal Private International Law Act (the “PILA”) does not address the exclusion of liability for arbitral institutions or arbitrators.

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228 Philipp Bärtsçh & Dorothée Schramm, Arbitration Law of Switzerland: Practice & Procedure 44 (2014) [hereinafter Bärtsçh & Schramm].

229 Id.


231 See Bärtsçh & Schramm, supra note 228.

232 Id. at 44.

vi. Sweden: Arbitral Institutions are Likely Liable for Actions Involving Fraud, Willful Misconduct or Gross Negligence

As is the case in Germany, so far, to the authors' knowledge, there have been no direct court decisions on the potential liability of arbitral institutions for their conduct administering arbitration proceedings. Likewise, Swedish law does not provide a statutory basis for the immunity of arbitral institutions. It has been suggested that the SCC's contractual liability waiver is to be interpreted like any other contractual exclusion clause under Swedish law, although the exact contractual relations between the arbitrators, parties and arbitral institution has yet to be worked out in detail.234 Article 36 of the Swedish Contracts Act prohibits exclusionary clauses that release a person from damages arising out of fraud, willful misconduct or gross negligence.235

Under Article 36 of the Swedish Contracts Act, exclusionary clauses may be declared void if they produce unreasonable results.236 In considering whether a term is unreasonable, the court should consider: the contents of the agreement; the circumstances at the time it was formed; subsequent circumstances; and general circumstances—basically, all circumstances.237 Article 36.1 mandates special attention be paid to the protection of the weaker party in the contractual relationship. To rise to gross negligence, the degree of negligence of behavior must be "bordering that of willfulness, in other words it shows a certain degree of ruthlessness or indifference which entails a considerable risk for damage."238 The hurdle is high: "[n]ot even in cases where the actor has been conscious of a risk of severe damage the action is always considered to be gross."239 The prohibition is reflected in Article 52 of the SCC Rules, which uses the same terms to qualify the contractual liability waiver.240

Sweden is not only an important forum state for arbitrations, but a case targeting the SCC was recently brought before its courts

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235 Lag om Avtal och Andra Rättshandlingar pa Förmögenhetsrättens Område [Swedish Contracts Act] (Svensk författningssamling [SFS] 1915:218) at §36 (Swed.).
236 Id.
239 Id.
240 SCC Rules, supra, note 28, at art. 52.
by a party to SCC-administered arbitration proceedings. In Case no. Ö 1952-05 (the “Soyak Case”), Soyak, a Turkish construction company, brought proceedings before the Swedish court against a three-member arbitral panel. The panel had rendered an award against Soyak in a construction dispute for a reduction and partial reimbursement of the arbitrators’ fee. Soyak brought first instance proceedings against the SCC for its role in setting the fees. Therein, Soyak had requested that “in the event that the City Court finds that the decision on the Arbitrators’ fee is not appealable, the Chamber of Commerce shall compensate Soyak on contractual grounds.”

Under Section 41 of the Swedish Arbitration Act, a party “may bring an action in the District Court against the award regarding the payment of compensation to the arbitrators.” The First Instance Court considered a decision premature as to whether the SCC may be held liable for its role in setting the arbitrators’ fees, as the action as formulated “presuppose[d] that the fee to the Arbitrators is not reduced or, as it must be understood, that it is not reduced to the degree sought by Soyak.” Since no judgment had been rendered in this regard, no “theoretical obligation [could] arise.” The case nevertheless shows that arbitral institutions’ actions are subject to scrutiny and that a finding of liability may be possible.

The Court of Appeal later decided that, in “an arbitration where the seat is Sweden, a decision on compensation to the arbitrators made by an arbitral institution, and subsequently included in the award, can be appealed in accordance with Section 41 of the Swedish Arbitration Act.”


When reviewing the contractual liability waivers in the rules of arbitral institutions seated in the European Union (“E.U.”), one must always also consider The Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Directive 1993/13 of the European Economic Community and its implementation regulations in the various E.U. Member States, which strike down any unfair terms in consumer contracts.

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243 Soyak Arbitration Decision, supra note 241.
244 See Soyak Case, supra note 111.
245 See Baizeau, supra note 110, at 383–86.
246 See Soyak Case, supra note 111, at 225.
of sale and supply of services. They are however, only relevant where one of the parties to the arbitration can be considered a consumer. This is rarely the case. As seen in the case of Germany, national legislation may have heightened protection against unfair terms, particularly standard terms going beyond the Directive.

2. Common Law: Arbitral Institutions are Quasi-Judicial Organizations and Enjoy Immunity Against Negligence and Errors of Procedure

i. England & Wales: The EEA 1996 Explicitly Grants Arbitral Institutions Immunity

In England & Wales, the immunity accorded to arbitrators is extended to appointing authorities and arbitral institutions. We have seen that the LCIA Arbitration Rules exclude the liability of the LCIA, which is broadly defined, for acts and omissions relating to LCIA administered arbitration, but not for deliberate wrongdoing or if prohibited under applicable laws. Contrary to what could be expected, the LCIA Arbitration Rules do not employ the same terminology as the EAA 1996. Section 74 of the EAA provides a statutory basis for an arbitral institution's immunity for actions "in discharge or purported discharge of their function, unless the act or omission is shown to have been in bad faith."\(^{247}\) The section is mandatory, so it cannot be opted out.\(^ {248}\) The statutory basis is in stark contrast to the French law position, which grants no such general immunity to arbitral institutions. Additionally, recognizing the tri-partite quality of the function of the arbitral institution, the EAA in Section 74.2 excludes the liability of an institution for the actions of an arbitrator (or his employees or agents) appointed or nominated by it. Without such immunity, it could be argued that the parties have a cause of action against the arbitral institutions for wrongdoings of the arbitrator appointed/nominated by the institutions. The immunities under English law, however, only protect arbitral institutions such as the LCIA if English law applies in the proceedings against the institution.\(^ {249}\) This also explains why arbitral institutions insert additional contractual waivers, even if the law of their seat guarantees their immunity.

The term "bad faith" is not defined in the EAA itself, and to the authors' knowledge there have not been any cases giving further meaning to it under the EAA. However, the term is used in

\(^{247}\) EAA, supra note 54.
\(^{248}\) Id.
\(^{249}\) See Scherer, supra note 197, at 373.
English public law to circumscribe the immunity of judges and regulators. In *Melton Medes Ltd v. Securities and Investment Board [1995] 3 All ER*, Justice Lightman suggested "bad faith" should be interpreted in the context of the tort of misfeasance "either (a) malice in the sense of personal spite or a desire to injure for improper [reasons]; or (b) knowledge of absence of power to make the decision in question." Given the international clientele and uncertainty of expression, it is reasonable that the LCIA employs the more exacting language of "conscious and deliberate wrongdoing committed by the body or person." Since Section 74 of the EAA is not dispositive, LCIA Arbitration Rules do not supersede its application. It should be stated that although bad faith may differ from fraud, contractual waivers to exclude liability for fraudulent acts or omissions are not permissible under English law.


Arbitrators and arbitral institutions are given almost absolute immunity for all actions undertaken in fulfilling their duties as arbitrators in the U.S. Section 14.A of the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act provides immunity to arbitrators to insulate them from unwarranted litigation and to ensure their independence. Likewise, Article 2 of the California Code of Civil Procedure Section 1297.119 provides that "[a]n arbitrator has the immunity of a judicial officer from civil liability when acting in the capacity of arbitrator under any statute or contract." The immunity afforded by this section shall supplement, and not supplant, any otherwise applicable common law or statutory immunity.

In the past, American jurisprudence has dealt with significant cases analyzing the interplay between arbitral immunity and

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251 Id. at 120; see also Rivers DC v. Bank of England [2004] UKHL 48, https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200304/ldjudgmt/jd041111/iv1-1.htm (bad faith is equated to reckless knowledge; Barrie Ingham. The justifications for immunity from damages liability for UK financial regulators, Company Lawyer 2010).
252 LCIA Rules, supra note 14, at art. 31.1.
wrongful actions of arbitral institutions. For instance, in Austern v. Chicago Board of Exchange, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit asserted that extending arbitral immunity to institutions that administer arbitrations was both natural and necessary to protect the policies that underlie arbitral immunity. Otherwise the arbitrator’s immunity would be merely an illusion.\(^{257}\) In Rubenstein v. Otterbourg, the AAA was granted immunity for its arbitral functions.\(^{258}\) The Civil Court of New York extended the liability that protects arbitrators to the institution, as it was deemed a quasi-judicial organization.\(^{259}\) In International Medical Group v. American Arbitration Association, the claimant asserted that the AAA had wrongly admitted the request for arbitration, as the claimant was a non-party to the arbitration agreement.\(^{260}\) The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit ruled the AAA was simply exercising an administrative function “similar to the administrative tasks of a court clerk accepting a complaint for filing.”\(^{261}\) The AAA is “immune from a suit based on wrongful exercise of jurisdiction.”\(^{262}\) In the same line, the Court held:

> “the appropriate remedy for an administrative mistake by [an arbitral institution] . . . would be for the wronged party to seek injunctive relief against the party initiating the arbitration in an appropriate court. [The institution administering the arbitration] need not be a party to that action and should be spared the burden of litigating the appropriateness of its exercise of jurisdiction.”\(^{263}\)

The American approach allows immunity to be granted to the arbitral institution even where it has failed to properly apply its own rules.\(^{264}\)

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\(^{257}\) See Austern v. Chicago Bd. Options Exchange, Inc., 898 F.2d 882 (2d Cir. 1990) (involving immunity granted to CBOE as sponsoring organization of arbitration where party sued CBOE for negligently impaneling arbitral tribunal and failing to provide notice).

\(^{258}\) See Rubenstein v. Otterbourg, 357 N.Y.S.2d 62 (1973) (suing AAA for failing to intervene and disqualify an arbitrator).

\(^{259}\) Id.

\(^{260}\) Int’l Med. Group, Inc. v. Am. Arbitration Ass’n, 312 F.3d 833 (7th Cir. 2002).

\(^{261}\) Id. at 844.

\(^{262}\) Id.

\(^{263}\) Id. at 448.

\(^{264}\) See Chan, supra note 18.
iii. Singapore, Ireland, And Malaysia: Immunity is Explicitly Guaranteed in Statute

Other common law countries such as Ireland and Singapore also provide for the immunity of arbitral institutions per statute.\textsuperscript{265} The Malaysian Arbitration Act of 2005 follows the same wording as the EAA in that it suggests that the immunity of the KLRCA and other centers does not extend to “act[s] or omission[s] . . . shown to have been in bad faith.”\textsuperscript{266} The purported blanket exclusion in the KLRCA’s Rules is more extensive than the mandatory provisions of the Malaysian Arbitration Act 2005.\textsuperscript{267} Accordingly, the Malaysian Arbitration Act circumscribes the KLRCA’s expansive waivers.

V. Conclusion

Institutional arbitration differs from ad hoc arbitration, in that it reflects the disputants’ choice of a specific arbitral institution to administer their disputes. This entails the application of the pertinent arbitral institution rules. These rules control the relationship between the arbitral institution and the parties. Furthermore, these rules extend to form the contours of both the relationships between the parties to the dispute and the arbitrators, and the agreement as between the arbitration institution and the arbitrators.

By submitting a notice for arbitration, the claimant activates the arbitration agreement. This bestows the arbitral institution named in the arbitration agreement with a hybrid of authorities and commitments, which are similar in ambit for many institutions. These powers encompass assessment of the existence of an arbitration agreement and their jurisdiction to administer the dispute, promoting the survival of the arbitration agreement and the arbitration process via the appointment and replacement of arbitrators, determination of the arbitration costs, and consolidation of parallel disputes. Most institutional rules stipulate that their decisions are binding and final. Some institutional rules explicitly categorize the nature of the decisions as administrative, as in the case of the LCIA Rules. The ICC has accepted the administrative nature of

\textsuperscript{265} See Schütze, supra note 2, at 159.
\textsuperscript{266} KLRCA Rules, supra note 66, at Rule 16.
its court decisions by announcing that it will communicate reasons for many of the administrative decisions.

The legal nature of their relationships between arbitral institutions with the parties and the arbitrators continues to remain unsettled in many jurisdictions. In fact, most institutional rules do not mention the applicable law that manages such relationships. As to treatment, the distinguishing line is blurred between common and civil law countries: most legal systems view these relationships as contractual.

Whereas arbitral institutions except for the TRAC attempt to secure their immunity from suit across the board, each institution's framework interacts with and is often circumscribed by the national laws at the institution's locale. Indeed, this interaction guarantees security from liability for arbitral institutions. Yet, the scope of immunity varies depending on the liability waiver provision in the relevant institutional rules. The article demonstrates that national laws diverge in the handling of the nature of arbitral institutions' decisions, obligations and immunities. In the cases of France and the U.S., where arbitral institutions have been more regularly on the receiving end of lawsuits, the extent of the institutions' immunities is more delineated. In other jurisdictions, the extent of the immunities of arbitral institutions is known in theory only without any jurisprudence to speak of, as is the case in Germany. Here case law has yet to evolve. It is therefore incumbent on institutions to assess their potential liabilities despite their often-extensive exclusion clauses, and risk exposure. This Article is to function as a starting point for institutions to do so.